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Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD), which is immune to all
detector side-channel attacks, is the most promising solution to the security issues in practical
quantum key distribution systems. Though several experimental demonstrations of MDI-QKD have
been reported, they all make one crucial but not yet verified assumption, that is there are no flaws
in state preparation. Such an assumption is unrealistic and security loopholes remain in the source.
Here we present, to our knowledge, the first MDI-QKD experiment with the modulation error taken
into consideration. By applying a security proof by Tamaki et al (Phys. Rev. A 90, 052314 (2014)),
we distribute secure keys over fiber links up to 40 km with imperfect sources, which would not have
been possible under previous security proofs. By simultaneously closing loopholes the detectors and
a critical loophole - modulation error in the source, our work shows the feasibility of secure QKD
with practical imperfect devices.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 42.50.Ex
Quantum key distribution (QKD), in principle, offers
unconditional security based on the laws of quantum
physics rather than computational complexity [1]. How-
ever, it has been realized that, due to the gap between
the security proof and real-life implementations, practical
QKD systems are vulnerable to various attacks [2].
Device-independent QKD (DI-QKD) [3], was proposed
to remove all assumptions of the internal working of
devices of QKD. The security of DI-QKD is based on
the loophole-free Bell test. Despite a number of re-
cent experimental demonstrations of loophole-free Bell
test [4], DI-QKD is impractical at practical distances
(20-30 km of telecom fiber) due to its low key rate of
about 10−10 bit per pulse [5]. Fortunately a proto-
col, namely the Measurement-Device-Independent QKD
(MDI-QKD), whose security is built on the time-reversed
entanglement QKD [6] , has been proposed [7] to remove
all potential security loopholes in the detection side, the
most vulnerable part of a QKD system (See also [8]). Sev-
eral MDI-QKD demonstrations using polarization [9, 10]
and time-bin phase [11] encoding have been reported.
More recently, MDI-QKD over 200 km [12], a field test
[13], a network demonstration [14], and an implemen-
tation with 1 GHz clock rate [15] have been reported,
highlighting the practicality of this protocol. MDI-QKD
with continuous variables has also been proposed in [16].
It is conceivable that MDI-QKD [7] will be widely
adopted in the near future. Since MDI-QKD is intrinsi-
cally immune to all detector side-channel attacks, eaves-
droppers will shift their focus from hacking the detectors
to hacking the sources, which are not protected in MDI-
QKD. Several theoretical studies on MDI-QKD with im-
perfect sources have been reported [17].
A crucial assumption in discrete-variable MDI-QKD
is that the source employed must be trusted. An ideal
trusted source need to satisfy two conditions: first,
the source only emits single photons; second, informa-
tion should be encoded without flaws. However, these
two conditions cannot be satisfied perfectly with to-
day’s technology. First, phase-randomized weak coher-
ent pulses (WCPs) rather than single-photon sources are
widely used in most QKD (including BB84 and MDI-
QKD) demonstrations. Fortunately, it has been shown
that unconditional security can still be achieved with
phase-randomized WCPs [18]. Furthermore, the perfor-
mance can be significantly improved with the decoy state
method [19]. Second, encoding quantum states onto op-
tical pulses has inherent errors due to the finite inac-
curacies in practical encoding devices. However, such
errors are ignored in all previous discrete-variable MDI-
QKD demonstrations [9–13]. It is unrealistic to ignore all
those errors because they may lead to security loopholes
that a eavesdropper might conceivably exploit to launch
attacks.
Such state preparation flaws can be taken care of using
the quantum coin idea [18, 20]. However, this approach
assumes the worst case in which an eavesdropper can
enhance the flaws by channel loss, and therefore the per-
formance is not loss tolerant. The study in [20] shows
that highly accurate state preparations are required in
MDI-QKD.
Recently, Tamaki et al have proposed a loss-tolerant
security proof [21] that can take modulation error - a
most crucial flaw in a QKD source, into consideration.
The loss-tolerant protocol is secure against the most gen-
eral type of attacks. For ease of discussion, the intuition
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2behind the security of the loss-tolerant protocol can be
understood for the example of the unambiguous state dis-
crimination (USD) attack. The idea is that, as long as
the states are encoded in 2-dimensional qubits [22], it is
impossible for Eve to launch a USD attack. Therefore
Eve cannot enhance state preparation flaws of qubits by
channel loss. The performance of QKD can thus be dra-
matically improved even when the state preparation flaws
are considered. This idea has been applied to both the
BB84 protocol and the three-state prepare-and-measure
protocol [23], and an experimental demonstration is re-
ported in [24].
It is noteworthy that this security proof can be applied
to MDI-QKD. In this Letter, we extend the work in [21]
and present an experimental demonstration of MDI-QKD
with state preparation imperfections over fiber links of
10 km and 40 km. By closing an important potential
loophole in MDI-QKD, we achieved improved security
compared to previous demonstrations.
The contributions of this Letter are as follows. First
and most importantly, in contrast to previous MDI-QKD
demonstrations [9–13] which unrealistically assume per-
fect state preparations, we carefully optimize the state
preparation to minimize the preparation flaws and per-
form a complete characterization of the states using
quantum state tomography. For the first time, we in-
clude the state preparation flaws into secure key rate es-
timation. We highlight that this would not have been
possible under previous security proofs [18, 20]. Second,
we remark that the analysis in [21] only applies to the
asymptotic case with an infinite number of decoy states
and an infinitely long key. We here present the theory
(see Supplemental Material) which shows how the loss-
tolerant protocol can be applied to MDI-QKD in a real-
istic setting, where only a finite number of decoy states
and a key of finite length are available. Third, we improve
the key generation speed by increasing the system rep-
etition rate from 500 kHz [9] to 10 MHz and employing
free-running single-photon detectors with 20% quantum
efficiency. These technological improvements enable us to
get a positive key rate within a reasonable time frame,
even when finite key effects and encoding flaws are taken
into account, and thus demonstrate the practicality of
the protocol.
We first briefly explain the loss-tolerant MDI-QKD
protocol. Alice (Bob) randomly encodes her (his) key
bits into one of the three polarization states {ρ0Z , ρ1Z ,
ρ0X}, where ρiα is the density matrix of the polarization
state of single photons corresponding to the bit value
i ∈ {0, 1} in the basis α ∈ {Z,X}. She (He) then sends
her (his) encoded WCPs to an untrusted third party, Eve,
who can be an eavesdropper, to do Bell state measure-
ments (BSMs). After a sufficient number of key bits have
been transmitted, Eve announces the BSM results to Al-
ice and Bob. Alice and Bob also announce their basis
choices over a public authenticated channel and generate
a sifted key. By revealing part of the sifted key, they can
estimate the bit error rate in the Z basis and perform
error corrections.
We apply the decoy state method [25] to estimate the
gain of single photons in the Z basis. The phase error
rate of single photons eX11, which quantifies the informa-
tion leakage to an eavesdropper, is estimated from the
transmission rates of fictitious states using the rejected
data analysis [21]. Privacy amplification can then be per-
formed to generate a secret key.
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FIG. 1. (Color online). Schematic of the experiment. Alice
(Bob) possesses a frequency-locked CW laser at 1542 nm. The
light is attenuated by an variable optical attenuator (VOA).
The phase is randomly modulated by a phase modulator (PM)
and the intensity is modulated by an intensity modulator (IM)
to generate phase-randomized WCPs. An acousto-optic mod-
ulator (AOM) is used to randomly switch the intensity be-
tween signal and decoy states. Key bits are encoded by a
polarization modulators (Pol-M1). Pol-M2 in Alice is used
for polarization alignment. Eve’s Bell state measurement
setup consists of a beam splitter (BS), three fiber polariza-
tion controllers (FPCs), a polarizing beam splitter (PBS),
two single-photon detectors (SPDs), and a time interval ana-
lyzer (TIA). Acronyms for other components: RNG: random
number generators; PG: pulse generators; EDL: electrical de-
lay line; SQU: square wave generator; OVDL: optical variable
delay line.
Fig.1 shows the schematic of our experiment. Alice
and Bob each have a CW laser whose wavelength is in-
dependently locked to the P16 line of a C13 acetylene
gas cell (integrated in Alice’s and Bob’s lasers by the
manufacturer) at 1542.38 nm. The frequency locking en-
sures that the frequency difference between Alice’s and
Bob’s lasers is within 10 MHz, guaranteeing the spec-
tral indistinguishability. The laser light is attenuated
by a variable optical attenuator (VOA) down to single-
photon level at the output of Alice’s / Bob’s system.
Its phase is randomized by a phase modulator into 1000
discrete random phases distributed uniformly in [0, 2pi],
which gives performance close to the case of continuous
phase randomization [26]. The amplitude of the light is
modulated by an intensity modulator (IM) to generate
3phase-randomized weak coherent pulses at a repetition
rate of f = 10 MHz, with a full width at half maximum
(FWHM) of around 2.5 ns.
Each pulse’s intensity is randomly modulated by an
acousto-optic modulator (AOM). We implement the 2-
decoy protocol, i.e., each pulse’s amplitude is modulated
to either the signal state or one of the two decoy states.
Key bits are encoded into the polarization states of the
optical pulses by a polarization modulator (Pol-M). The
Pol-M consists of a phase modulator, an optical circu-
lator, and a Faraday mirror. Polarization modulation is
achieved by bi-directional modulation of the phase differ-
ence of the TE and TM components of the waveguide in
the phase modulator. Details of the Pol-M setup can be
found in [9, 27]. In the three state protocol, each pulse’s
polarization is randomly modulated to one of the three
BB84 states: the horizontal state ρ0Z , the vertical state
ρ1Z , and the diagonal state ρ0X . We fine tuned the volt-
ages on the Pol-Ms to minimize the preparation flaws of
these states. See the Supplemental Material for details.
Alice’s and Bob’s pulses are sent through 2 sepa-
rate fiber spools to Eve for Bell state measurements
(BSMs). BSMs require indistinguishability between Al-
ice and Bob’s pulses in all degrees of freedom (except
polarization, which is used for encoding). The spectral
indistinguishability can be guaranteed by frequency lock-
ing in the laser as discussed above (the frequency differ-
ence of 10 MHz is much less than the bandwidth of a
transform-limited pulse of 2.5 ns). To achieve the tempo-
ral indistinguishability, arrival times of Alice’s and Bob’s
pulses are controlled by two passive electrical delay lines
(EDLs) and two optical variable delay lines (OVDLs).
The EDLs, which can adjust the delay of the the clock
signal driving the intensity modulators (and thus the ar-
rival time of the pulses), have a resolution of 0.5 ns and a
range of 63.5 ns, and are used for coarse temporal align-
ments. The relative delay is further finely adjusted by
the OVDLs with a resolution less than 10 ps, which is
much smaller than the pulses’ width of 2.5 ns FWHM.
Alice and Bob need to establish a common polariza-
tion reference frame. To achieve this, they first align
their Z basis (ρ0Z and ρ1Z ) to the polarizing axes of the
PBS in Eve’s BSM setup. Alice has an extra polarization
modulator (Pol-M2 in Fig.1) in her lab. This modulator
modulates the relative phase between |H〉 (ρ0Z ) and |V 〉
(ρ1Z ). This is equivalent to a unitary rotation about the
H − V axis on the Poincare´ sphere, and the amount of
rotation depends on the voltage applied on Pol-M2. Al-
ice adjusts the voltage such that her diagonal state ρ0X
is aligned to that of Bob.
Alice and Bob’s pulses interfere at the 50/50 beam
splitter and are sent to a polarizing beam splitter (PBS),
whose outputs are connected to two free running In-
GaAs/InP single-photon detectors (SPDs, ID220) with
20% quantum efficiency and a dark count rate of 2 kHz.
Times of the detection events (relative to the clock signal)
are recorded by a time interval analyzer (TIA). Within
each period (100 ns), a 7 ns window is chosen (by cali-
brating the arrival times of optical pulses) to post-select
detection events. Therefore, over 90% of the dark count
noise can be removed and the effective dark count proba-
bility per window is around 1.5×10−5. A coincidence be-
tween these two detectors implies a successful projection
onto the triplet Bell state |Ψ+〉 = (|HV 〉+ |V H〉)/√2.
We characterize the polarization states ρ0Z , ρ1Z , ρ0X}
prepared by the Pol-Ms using quantum state tomogra-
phy. We perform projective measurements by sending
the polarization-encoded photons to a polarization an-
alyzer (HP8169A), which consists of a half-wave plate
(HWP), a quarter-wave plate (QWP), and a polarizer
(POL). Angles of the waveplates and the polarizer are
driven by electrical motors with an accuracy of ±0.1◦
(specified by the manufacturer). A SPD is connected
to the output of the polarizer for detections. Each in-
put state ρjα , jα ∈ {0Z , 1Z , 0X}, is projected into the
following polarization states: |H〉 (horizontal), |V 〉 (ver-
tical), |D〉 (diagonal), and |R〉 (right-hand circular), and
counts are accumulated for 10 s for each projective mea-
surement. Density matrices can then be reconstructed
using the maximum likelihood technique [28].
FIG. 2. (Color online).Results of quantum state tomogra-
phy. Density matrices are represented by their Stokes param-
eters and plotted on the Poincare´ sphere. The Stokes pa-
rameters (S1, S2, S3) of the states are: ρ0Z (-0.0032 ±0.0042,
0.0106 ±0.0055, 0.9994 ±0.0002); ρ1Z (-0.0375 ±0.0040, -
0.0662 ±0.0052, -0.9962 ±0.0005); ρ0X (-0.6963 ± 0.0028,
0.7163 ± 0.0016, -0.0128 ± 0.0029).
Errors in the quantum state tomography are mostly
due to the following factors: errors in counting statistics,
errors in the projection states, and drift of the source’s
intensity and drift of the input state. We monitor the
intensity during the experiment, and do not observe sig-
nificant drift in intensity. The drift in input states is
due to the random unitary transformation induced by
the short fiber connecting the encoding system and the
polarization analyzer. We characterize the stability and
find that the input states remain relatively stable within
the span of the quantum state tomography measurement.
4We therefore only consider the first two errors. Errors in
counting statistics follow the Poisson distribution. Er-
rors in projection states are due to errors in setting
waveplates’ angles, which follow the Gaussian distribu-
tion with an accuracy of ±0.1◦. We use Monte-Carlo
method [28] to estimate the errors in the density matri-
ces. Additional sets of data are generated numerically
using the above distributions. Each set of data (consist-
ing of counts and waveplate angles) is used to generate
a density matrix by the maximum likelihood technique.
We generate 1,000 additional simulated results for each
state ρjα to get the error distributions of the Stokes pa-
rameters. The reconstructed density matrices together
with their errors are shown in Fig.2.
We quantify the overlap between two states ρjα
and ρsβ by F (ρjα , ρsβ )
2, where F (ρjα , ρsβ ) =
Tr[
√√
ρjαρsβ
√
ρjα ] is the fidelity between ρjα and
ρsβ . The overlap between the states ρ0Z and ρ1Z is
F (ρ0Z , ρ1Z )
2 = 0.0024±0.0006 (whereas the ideal overlap
is 0), and the overlaps between ρ0X and ρ0Z , and between
ρ0X and ρ1Z , are F (ρ0X , ρ0Z )
2 = 0.4994 ± 0.0030 and
F (ρ0Z , ρ1Z )
2 = 0.4963 ± 0.0028, respectively (whereas
the ideal overlaps are 0.5). These results are comparable
to other reported results in commercial [24] and research
[29] QKD systems. Further details of the state charac-
terization can be found in the Supplemental Material.
We implement the three state loss-tolerant MDI-QKD
over 10 km and 40 km of SMF-28 optical fibers.
In the 10 km demonstration, Alice and Bob are each
connected to Eve by a 5 km fiber spool. We optimize the
intensities and probability distributions of the signal and
decoy states using the model in [25]. The intensity of the
signal state is chosen to be µ = 0.20 photon per pulse,
and the intensities for the two decoy state are ν1 = 0.03
and ν2 = 0 photon per pulse. The probability to send
out the signal state µ and the decoy states ν1 and ν2 are
Pµ = 0.3, Pν1 = 0.4, and Pν2 = 0.3, respectively. The
probabilities to send out the states ρ0Z , ρ1Z , and ρ0X are
P0Z = 0.25, P1Z = 0.25, and P0X = 0.5, respectively. A
total of N = 6× 1011 pulses are sent out.
The lower bound of the secure key rate is given by [7]
R ≥ Q11,LZ [1− h(e11,UX )]−QµµZ f(EµµZ )h(EµµZ ), (1)
where Q11,LZ is the lower bound of the gain of single-
photon states given that both Alice and Bob send out
signal states µ in the Z basis, e11,UX is the upper bound
of the phase error rate of single-photon components, QµµZ
is the gain when both of them send signal states, EµµZ is
the quantum bit error rate (QBER) of the signal states
in the Z basis, f(EµµZ ) = 1.16 is the efficiency of error
correction, and h(x) = −xlog2(x) − (1 − x)log2(1 − x)
is the Shannon entropy. The values of QµµZ and E
µµ
Z are
directly measured from the sifted key, and are shown in
Table I.
The value of Q11,LZ is estimated using the decoy state
method [25, 30]. We consider 3 standard deviations of
statistical fluctuations for finite key analysis, and find
Q11,LZ = 3.96× 10−5.
With the Stokes parameters of the encoded states, we
upper bound the phase error rate e11,UX = 18.9% using the
rejected data analysis [21] and the decoy state method.
We can then lower bound the secure key rate R ≥ 2.48×
10−6 bit per signal pulse. The number of pulses where
both Alice and Bob send signal states µ in the Z basis
is NµµZ = 1.35 × 1010, and a private key of length L =
NµµZ R = 33.8 kbits is generated.
The high phase error rate is due to the small key size in
this demonstration. We also estimate the key rate with-
out finite-key correction, as shown in Table I. Besides,
we perform a proof-of-principle demonstration at 40 km.
Intensities of the signal and decoy states are the same
as those in the 10 km demonstration. The key rate is
estimated without finite-key correction. See Table I for
details.
As a comparison, we simulate the performance of MDI-
QKD with source flaws using the three-state loss-tolerant
analysis and the GLLP analysis[18, 20]. The result is
shown in Fig.3, which indicates that no secure key can be
generated using the GLLP analysis, even for an infinitely
long key.
In summary, we have demonstrated the first MDI-
QKD experiment with an important type of source flaws
taken into consideration. In contrast to previous demon-
strations which assume perfect state modulations with-
out verification, our experiment shows the feasibility of
generating secure keys with imperfect states prepared by
off-the-shelf devices. The methodology developed here
can be applied to high speed systems [15] and in a net-
work setting [14]. In future, it will be intersting to con-
sider other source flaws in MDI-QKD, for example, im-
perfect phase randomizations [26].
We thank F. Xu, E. Zhu, and M. Curty for enlightening
discussions. Financial support from NSERC Discovery
Grant, NSERC RTI Grant, and the Canada Research
Chairs Program is gratefully acknowledged.
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL
Upper-bounding phase error rate by rejected data
analysis
In this section, we give the algorithm used in the Letter
to estimate the phase error rate e11X using the rejected
data analysis as proposed in [21].
In the actual three-state MDI-QKD protocol, Alice and
Bob send the untrusted third party Eve photons encoded
in one of the three polarization states. Let |φjα〉AeE be
the purification of the state ρE,jα sent by Alice to Eve,
where jα ∈ {0Z , 1Z , 0X}, and the subscripts Ae and E
represent the extended system possessed by Alice and the
system to be sent to Eve, respectively. Sending the state
5TABLE I. Key rate for loss-tolerant MDI-QKD at 10 km and 40 km. An infinitely long key (∞ in data size) indicates that finite
key effect is not considered when estimating the key rate R. The inefficiency of error correction is chosen to be f(EZµµ) = 1.16.
Distance Data size Security bound QZ,L11 e
X,U
11 Q
Z
µµ E
Z
µµ R (bit per pulse)
10 km 6× 1011 10−3 3.96× 10−5 0.189 6.31× 10−5 0.0178 2.48× 10−6
10 km ∞ N/A 4.17× 10−5 0.079 6.31× 10−5 0.0178 1.57× 10−5
40 km ∞ N/A 1.88× 10−5 0.122 2.94× 10−5 0.0368 1.00× 10−6
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FIG. 3. (Color online). The upper figure shows the simu-
lated and experimental key rates of the loss-tolerant MDI-
QKD protocol, for both the infinitely long key case and the
finite-key case. We use δ
pi
to quantify the relative modula-
tion error. See Supplemental Material for the exact defi-
nition of δ. The modulation error δ = 0.1 corresponds to
F (ρ0Z , ρ1Z ) = 0.0025, which is close to our experimental
value. The lower figure shows the simulated key rates for
an infinitely long key under the GLLP analysis. The results
show that the loss-tolerant protocol gives a positive key rate
for realistic values of encoding flaws, while no key can be
generated with the GLLP proof. We use our experimental
parameters for simulation.
ρE,0Z (ρE,1Z ) to Eve by Alice is equivalent to preparing
the tripartite state of systems A, Ae, E
|Ψ〉AAeE =
1√
2
(|0Z〉A|φ0Z 〉AeE + |1Z〉A|φ1Z 〉AeE) (2)
followed by a projective measurement on system A in the
Z basis with an outcome of 0 (1), and sending system E
to Eve.
Likewise, sending ρ0Z (ρ1Z ) to Eve by Bob is equivalent
to preparing the tripartite state |Ψ〉BBeE′ with systems
B, Be, and E
′,
|Ψ〉BBeE′ =
1√
2
(|0Z〉B |φ0Z 〉BeE′ +|1Z〉B |φ1Z 〉BeE′), (3)
followed by a projective measurement on system B in
the Z basis with outcome 0 (1), and sending system E′
to Eve.
Now consider the following virtual protocol. Alice pre-
pares the state |Ψ〉AAeE , measures system A in the X
basis with outcome j ∈ {0, 1}, and sends Eve the system
E. The state sent to Eve can be written as
σˆvirE,jX = TrAAe [Pˆ (|jX〉A)IAeEPˆ (|Ψ〉AAeE)], (4)
where Pˆ (x) = |x〉〈x|, and |jX〉 = 1/
√
2(|0Z〉+(−1)j |1Z〉).
Similarly, Bob prepares the state |Ψ〉BBeE , measures sys-
tem B in the X basis with outcome s ∈ {0, 1}, and sends
Eve the system E′ whose state is given by
σˆvirE′,sX = TrBBe [Pˆ (|sX〉B)IBeE′ Pˆ (|Ψ〉BBeE′)], (5)
where |sX〉 = 1/
√
2(|0Z〉+ (−1)s|1Z〉).
The phase error rate of single photon components is de-
termined by the transmission rates of the fictitious states:
e11X =
Y Ψ
+,vir
0X1X
+ Y Ψ
+,vir
1X0X
Y Ψ
+,vir
0X0X
+ Y Ψ
+,vir
1X1X
+ Y Ψ
+,vir
0X1X
+ Y Ψ
+,vir
1X0X
. (6)
where Y Ψ
+
jXsX
is the probability that Alice and Bob send
Eve the virtual states σˆE,jX and σˆE′,sX , respectively, and
Eve gets a successful Bell state measurement with out-
come |Ψ+〉 = (|H〉|V 〉+ |V 〉|H〉)/√2, which is given by
Y Ψ
+,vir
jXsX
= Tr[σˆvirE,jX ]Tr[σˆ
vir
E′,sX ]Tr[DˆΨ+ σˆ
′vir
E,jX ⊗ σˆ′
vir
E′,sX ].
(7)
In the above equation, the operator Dˆψ+ is Eve’s oper-
ation corresponding to the BSM with outcome Ψ+, and
the operators σˆ′
vir
E,jX and σˆ
′vir
E′,jX are the normalized ver-
sions of σˆvirE,jX and σˆ
vir
E′,jX given by
σˆ′
vir
E,jX = σˆ
vir
E,jX/Tr[σˆ
vir
E,jX ]
σˆ′
vir
E′,jX = σˆ
vir
E′,jX/Tr[σˆ
vir
E′,jX ]
(8)
The density operators of the virtual states σˆvirE,jX and
σˆvirE′,sX can be found from the density operators of the
6actual states ρjα . From Eqs. (2) and (4), the virtual
state σE,jX sent to Eve by Alice is
σˆvirE,jX =TrAAe [Pˆ (|jX〉A)IAeEPˆ (|Ψ〉AAeE)]
=
1
4
[(ρE,0Z + ρE,1Z ) + (−1)jTrAe(|φ1Z 〉AeE〈φ0Z |AeE
+ |φ0Z 〉AeE〈φ1Z |AeE)].
(9)
Let |γ0jα〉E and |γ1jα〉E be the eigenvectors of ρE,jα , and
|λ0E,jα |2 and |λ1E,jα |2 be the corresponding eigenvalues.
The Schmidt decomposition of |φjα〉AeE is
|φjα〉AeE = λ0E,jα |0〉Ae |γ0jα〉E + λ1E,jα |1〉Ae |γ1jα〉E (10)
where {|0〉Ae |1〉Ae} is a basis of Alice’s extended system
Ae. Note that since Alice possesses the extended system
Ae, she can select the basis {|0〉Ae |1〉Ae} in the purifi-
cation of ρE,jα to optimize the key rate. In this paper,
we use the same basis {|0〉Ae |1〉Ae} for the purification
of ρE,0Z and ρE,1Z , which is not necessarily the optimal
choice. The key rate can be further improved by opti-
mizing the purification, which is left as future work.
Substituting Eq. (10) into (9), the virtual state σˆvirE,jX
is
σˆvirE,jX =
1
4
{(ρE,0Z + ρE,1Z )
+ (−1)j [λ0E,0Zλ0E,1Z (|γ00Z 〉E〈γ01Z |E + |γ01Z 〉E〈γ00Z |E)
+ λ1E,0Zλ
1
E,1Z (|γ10Z 〉E〈γ11Z |E + |γ11Z 〉E〈γ10Z |E)]}.
(11)
The density operator σvirE′,sX (the virtual state sent to
Eve by Bob) can be found using the same method.
We first discuss the case where the states lie in the
X −Z plane. In this case, the Stokes parameter SY = 0,
and the states σˆ′
vir
E,jX (with Stokes parameters (S
vir,X
E,jX
,
0, Svir,ZE,jX ) and σˆ
′vir
E′,sX (with Stokes parameters (S
vir,X
E,jX
,
0, Svir,ZE,jX ) can be written as a linear combination of the
identity matrix σˆI and the Pauli matrices σˆX , σˆZ :
σˆ′
vir
E,jX =
1
2
(σˆI + S
vir,X
E,jX
σˆX + S
vir,Z
E,jX
σˆZ) (12)
σˆ′
vir
E′,sX =
1
2
(σˆI + S
vir,X
E′,sX σˆX + S
vir,Z
E′,sX σˆZ) (13)
Define the transmission rate of σˆt⊗σˆt′ , t, t′ ∈ {I,X,Z}
as
qΨ+|t,t′ =
1
4
Tr[DˆΨ+ σˆt ⊗ σˆt′ ]. (14)
From Eqs. (7) and (14), the transmission rate Y Ψ
+
jXsX
can be written as
Y Ψ
+,vir
jXsX
= Tr[σˆvirE,jX ]Tr[σˆ
vir
E′,sX ]× (qΨ+|I⊗I + Svir,XE′,sX qΨ+|I⊗X + S
vir,Z
E′,sX qΨ+|I⊗Z
+ Svir,XE,jX qΨ+|X⊗I + S
vir,X
E,jX
Svir,XE′,sX qΨ+|X⊗X + S
vir,X
E,jX
Svir,ZE′,sX qΨ+|X⊗Z
+ Svir,ZE,jX qΨ+|Z⊗I + S
vir,Z
E,jX
Svir,XE′,sX qΨ+|Z⊗X + S
vir,Z
E,jX
Svir,ZE′,sX qΨ+|Z⊗Z)
(15)
Let SvirjXsX be a row vector and q be a column vector defined as
SvirjXsX = [1, S
vir,X
E′,sX , S
vir,Z
E′,sX , S
vir,X
E,jX
, Svir,XE,jX S
vir,X
E′,sX , S
vir,X
E,jX
Svir,ZE′,sX , S
vir,Z
E,jX
, Svir,ZE,jX S
vir,X
E′,sX , S
vir,Z
E,jX
Svir,ZE′,sX ], (16)
q = [qΨ+|I⊗I , qΨ+|I⊗X , qΨ+|I⊗Z , qΨ+|X⊗I , qΨ+|X⊗X , qΨ+|X⊗Z , qΨ+|Z⊗X , qΨ+|Z⊗Z ]T , (17)
respectively. The expression for the transmission rate
Y Ψ
+,vir
jXsX
(Eq. (15)) can be written as
Y Ψ
+,vir
jXsX
= Tr[σˆvirE,jX ]Tr[σˆ
vir
E′,sX ]S
vir
jXsXq. (18)
Once we know the transmission rates of the Pauli matri-
ces q, we can estimate Y Ψ
+,vir
jXsX
and the phase error rate
e11X . In the next session, we will discuss how to find q
from experimental data.
When the states ρE,jα prepared by Alice / Bob do not
7lie in the X − Z plane, we can always find a reference
frame such that the states ρE,0Z , ρE,1Z , and ρE,0X have
a common Stokes parameter SYE (i.e., the Stokes param-
eters of the state ρE,jα is given by (S
X
E,jα
, SYE , S
Z
E,jα
).)
We apply the filtering technique described in [21], which
shows that, for a state ρE,jα with a nonzero S
Y
E , we can
equivalently consider the following state with its Stokes
parameters given by,
(
SXE,jα
f(q)
, 0,
SZE,jα
f(q)
) (19)
where f(q) is given by
f(q) =
2(1− q)q
1− 2q + 2q2 (20)
and q is determined by solving the following equation
SYE =
(2q − 1)
(1− 2q + 2q2) . (21)
Estimating transmission rates of Pauli matrices from
experimental data
In this section, we will show how to estimate the trans-
mission rates of Pauli matrices q from experimental data.
Recall in the three-state MDI-QKD, Alice (Bob) ran-
domly sends Eve one of the three states ρE,0Z (ρE′,0Z ),
ρE,1Z (ρE′,1Z ), ρE,0X (ρE′,0X ). As in the previous sec-
tion, the subscripts E and E′ represent the systems sent
to Eve by Alice and Bob, respectively.
Let Y Ψ
+,11
jαsβ
be the conditional probability that Eve gets
a successful Bell state measurement with outcome Ψ+
given that Alice sends Eve a single photon of state ρE,jα
and Bob sends Eve a single photon of state ρE′,sβ (the su-
perscript 11 represent that both Alice and Bob send out
single photons). Following the procedures described in
the previous section, the transmission rate of the actual
states Y Ψ
+,11
jαsβ
can be written as
Y Ψ
+,11
jαsβ
= Sjαsβq, (22)
where Sjαsβ is related to the actual states ρE,jα (with
Stokes parameters (SXE,jα , 0, S
Z
E,jα
) and ρE′,sβ (with
Stokes parameters (SXE′,sbeta, 0, S
Z
E′,sβ ) as follows:
Sjαsβ = [1, S
X
E′,sβ , S
Z
E′,sβ , S
X
E,jα , S
X
E,jαS
X
E′,sβ , S
X
E,jαS
Z
E′,sβ , S
Z
E,jα , S
Z
E,jαS
X
E′,sβ , S
Z
E,jαS
Z
E′,sβ ]. (23)
From experiment, we can get the following set of inde-
pendent linear equations:
Y Ψ
+,11
0Z0Z
= S0Z0Zq,
Y Ψ
+,11
0Z1Z
= S0Z1Zq,
Y Ψ
+,11
1Z0Z
= S1Z0Zq,
Y Ψ
+,11
1Z1Z
= S1Z1Zq,
Y Ψ
+,11
0X0Z
= S0X0Zq,
Y Ψ
+,11
0X1Z
= S0X1Zq,
Y Ψ
+,11
0Z0X
= S0Z0Xq,
Y Ψ
+,11
1Z0X
= S1Z0Xq,
Y Ψ
+,11
0X0X
= S0X0Xq.
(24)
Define a vector YΨ
+,11
YΨ
+,11 = [Y Ψ
+,11
0Z0Z
, Y Ψ
+,11
0Z1Z
, Y Ψ
+,11
1Z0Z
, Y Ψ
+,11
1Z1Z
,
Y Ψ
+,11
0X0Z
, Y Ψ
+,11
0X1Z
, Y Ψ
+,11
0Z0X
, Y Ψ
+,11
1Z0X
, Y Ψ
+,11
0X0X
]
(25)
and a matrix S
S =

S0Z0Z
S0Z1Z
S1Z0Z
S1Z1Z
S0X0Z
S0X1Z
S0Z0X
S1Z0X
S0X0X

The linear system (24) can be concisely written as
YΨ
+,11 = Sq. (26)
Knowing YΨ
+,11 from the experiment, the transmis-
sion rates q can be solved:
q = S−1YΨ
+,11. (27)
The transmission rates of the virtual states can then
be calculated by Eq.(18), and the phase error rate can
be estimated by Eq.(6).
8Bounding e11X with a finite number of decoy states
In the previous two sections, we give the method to
estimate the phase error rate e11X from the Y
Ψ+,11
jαsβ
, which
is the yield of single photon components. The param-
eter Y Ψ
+,11
jαsβ
can be precisely estimated with an infinite
number of decoy states.
In reality, we can only apply a finite number of decoy
states, where the value of Y Ψ
+,11
jαsβ
can not be precisely de-
termined. Instead, we can find an upper bound Y Ψ
+,11,U
jαsβ
,
and a lower bound Y Ψ
+,11,L
jαsβ
, either analytically [25? ] or
by linear programming. In this case, the linear system
(24, 26) should be replaced with the following linear in-
equality:
YΨ
+,11,L ≤ Sq ≤ YΨ+,11,U. (28)
where
YΨ
+,11,L = [Y Ψ
+,11,L
0Z0Z
, Y Ψ
+,11,L
0Z1Z
, Y Ψ
+,11,L
1Z0Z
, Y Ψ
+,11,L
1Z1Z
,
Y Ψ
+,11,L
0X0Z
, Y Ψ
+,11,L
0X1Z
, Y Ψ
+,11,L
0Z0X
, Y Ψ
+,11,L
1Z0X
, Y Ψ
+,11,L
0X0X
],
(29)
and
YΨ
+,11,U = [Y Ψ
+,11,U
0Z0Z
, Y Ψ
+,11,U
0Z1Z
, Y Ψ
+,11,U
1Z0Z
, Y Ψ
+,11,U
1Z1Z
,
Y Ψ
+,11,U
0X0Z
, Y Ψ
+,11,U
0X1Z
, Y Ψ
+,11,U
0Z0X
, Y Ψ
+,11,U
1Z0X
, Y Ψ
+,11,U
0X0X
].
(30)
Our task is to find an upper bound of the phase error
rate e11X . The expression of e
11
X (Eq. 6) can be rewritten
as
e11X =
1
1 +
Y Ψ
+,vir
0X0X
+Y Ψ
+,vir
1X1X
Y Ψ
+,vir
0X1X
+Y Ψ
+,vir
1X0X
. (31)
The upper bound of e11X found by lower bounding
Y Ψ
+,vir
0X0X
+Y Ψ
+,vir
1X1X
and upper bounding Y Ψ
+,vir
0X1X
+Y Ψ
+,vir
1X0X
:
e11X ≤ e11,UX =
1
1 +
(Y Ψ
+,vir
0X0X
+Y Ψ
+,vir
1X1X
)L
(Y Ψ
+,vir
0X1X
+Y Ψ
+,vir
1X0X
)U
. (32)
Finding a lower bound of Y Ψ
+,vir
0X0X
+ Y Ψ
+,vir
1X1X
is equiva-
lent to the following linear programming problem:
min
q
{(Tr[σˆvirE,0X ]Tr[σˆvirE′,0X ]Svir0X0X
+ Tr[σˆvirE,1X ]Tr[σˆ
vir
E′,1X ]S
vir
1X1X)q}
(33)
subject to the constraint given by inequality (28).
Similarly, upper bounding Y Ψ
+,vir
0X1X
+ Y Ψ
+,vir
1X0X
is equiv-
alent to the following linear programming problem:
max
q
{(Tr[σˆvirE,0X ]Tr[σˆvirE′,1X ]Svir0X1X
+ Tr[σˆvirE,1X ]Tr[σˆ
vir
E′,0X ]S
vir
1X0X)q}
(34)
subject to the constraint (28).
State Characterization
In this session, we discuss the sources of errors involved
in preparing the BB84 states, and how we minimize the
state preparation errors. We then present the details of
state characterization using quantum state tomography.
Sources of encoding errors
Fig. 4 shows the schematic of the bi-directional po-
larization modulator [27]. Optical pulses are launched
through an optical circulator to a phase modulator (PM).
The polarization of the light is at 45◦ to the TE axis of
the LiNbO3 waveguide inside the PM. When an optical
pulse travels through the PM for the first time, a positive
voltage +V is applied on the phase modulator. The pulse
is reflected by a Faraday mirror (FM) with its polariza-
tion rotated by 90◦, and travels back. When the pulse
travels through the PM for the second time, a negative
voltage −V is applied on the PM. Due to the different
modulation efficiency in the TE and TM modes, we intro-
duce a phase difference along the TE and TM directions.
The output state can be expressed as
|ψ〉 = |TE〉+ e
iψ|TM〉√
2
, (35)
where |TE〉 and |TM〉 represent the polarization states
along the TE and TM directions of the PM’s waveguide,
and ψ is the phase difference introduced, which depends
on the applied voltage. By modulating ψ to {0, pi, pi/2},
we can generate the three states {ρ0Z , ρ1Z , ρ0X} needed
in our protocol.
Here we discuss the sources of errors in the encoding
system that lead to imperfect state preparations.
Power mismatch in TE and TM modes Ideally we want
optical pulses to be launched into the PM at an angle of
45◦ relative to the TE axis of the PM’s waveguide. Is
this case, the powers along the TE and TM directions are
equal, and the output states {ρ0Z , ρ1Z , ρ0X} are located
on a great circle on the Poincare´ sphere. However, optical
pulses may be launched at an angle κ other than 45◦.
In this case, the modulated output state 35 should be
rewritten as
|ψ〉 = cos(κ)|TE〉+ sin(κ)eiψ|TM〉. (36)
9As a result, the output states {ρ0Z , ρ1Z , ρ0X} are
distributed on a small circle on the Poincare´ sphere.
In this case, ρ0Z and ρ1Z are no longer orthogonal,
and their overlap (characterized by F (ρ0Z , ρ0Z )
2, where
F (ρ0Z , ρ0Z ) is the fidelity between ρ0Z and ρ1Z ) is
cos2(2κ). This is the dominant error that lead to modu-
lation errors in our encoding system.
Control voltage accuracy The accuracy is limited by
the voltage resolution of the signal source driving the
PM. In our experiment, the waveform generator driving
the PM has an output amplitude of±5 V and a resolution
of 1 mV. The Vpi of the PM is around 5 V, which means
that error due to limited resolution of the driving voltage
is relatively small.
To minimize the errors in the state preparation, we
finely scan the voltage applied on the phase modulator
at a step of 0.02 V and characterize the corresponding
output states. The step size of 0.02 V guarantees that
the error due to voltage accuracy is less than 0.4%. Fig.
5 shows different states corresponding to different volt-
ages applied on the polarization modulator. ρ0Z corre-
sponds to the state when the applied voltage is 0 V. We
search around 2.5 V and 5.0 V at a step size of 0.02 V to
search the states ρ0X and ρ1Z with minimum encoding
errors. Each point on the Poincare´ sphere corresponds
one applied voltage. The states are reconstructed using
quantum state tomography, as discussed in the next sec-
tion. Fig. 6 shows the overlap between ρ0Z and ρ0X , and
the overlap between ρ0Z and ρ1Z , with different voltages.
The voltage for ρ0X is chosen such that the overlap be-
tween ρ0Z and ρ0X is as close to 0.5 as possible, and the
voltage for ρ1Z is chosen such that the overlap between
ρ0Z and ρ1Z is minimized.
Quantum state tomography
Fig.7 shows the setup of the quantum state tomogra-
phy experiment. Optical pulses encoded in the polariza-
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FIG. 4. (Color online). Schematic of the polarization modu-
lator.
tion state ρjα, where jα ∈ {0Z , 1Z , 0X}, are sent to the
electrical polarization controller for projective measure-
ments. The projective state |ψ〉 is given by
|ψ〉 = U†HWP (θ)U†QWP (φ)|H〉. (37)
The operations UHWP (φ) and UQWP (φ) are the unitary
transformations by a half wave plate (HWP) and a quar-
ter wave plate (QWP) with fast axes set to θ and φ,
respectively, which are given by
UHWP (θ) =
[
cos(2θ) sin(2θ)
sin(2θ) −cos(2θ)
]
UQWP (φ) =
[
cos2(φ) + isin2(φ) (1− i)cos(φ)sin(φ)
(1− i)cos(φ)sin(φ) sin2(φ) + icos2(φ)
]
.
In the tomography experiment, each state ρjα is pro-
jected into the following four polarization basis states:
horizontal |H〉, vertical |V 〉, diagonal|D〉, and right-hand
circular |R〉. The settings of the HWP, QWP, and POL
are summarized in Table II. Photons are detected by a
single photon detector (SPD1). Another single photon
detector (SPD2) is used to monitor the total intensity of
the incoming light pulses. The data acquisition time for
each projective measurement is t = 10s, and the counts
are summarized in Table III.
Below we describe the procedures to reconstruct the
density matrices from the data in Table III (see next sec-
tion) using the maximum likelihood technique [28]. For
FIG. 5. (Color online). Search of the states with minimum
encoding errors. We scan the voltages applied on the polariza-
tion modulator to find the states ρ0X and ρ1Z with minimum
modulation errors.
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FIG. 6. (Color online). Overlap between ρ0Z and ρ0X , and
overlap between ρ0Z and ρ1Z , with different voltages applied
on the Pol-M. The voltage for ρ0X is chosen to get the overlap
between ρ0Z and ρ0X as close to 0.5 as possible, and the
voltage for ρ1Z is chosen such that the overlap between ρ0Z
and ρ1Z is minimized.
each projective measurement, counts detected by SPD1
are accumulated for 10s, and the results are shown in Ta-
ble I of the main text. The total counts corresponding to
the projective measurement to |H〉, |V 〉, |D〉, and |R〉 are
denoted as nH , nV , nD, and nR, respectively. We first
calculate a normalized count rate n˜ψ, ψ ∈ {H,V,D,R}
to correct the impacts of dark counts and deadtime:
n˜ψ =
nψ
t− nψτ −DC (38)
where t = 10s is the data acquisition time, τ = 10µs
is the detector deadtime, and DC = 50Hz is the dark
count rate. Note that in the above expression, the term
(t−nψτ) gives the total active time of the detector during
t, and
nψ
t−nψτ gives the counting rate per unit active time.
The density matrix to be reconstructed can be written
as
ρjα =
T †jαTjα
Tr[T †jαTjα ]
. (39)
where T †jα is the conjugate transpose of Tjα , and Tjα is
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FIG. 7. (Color online). Schematic of the quantum state to-
mography setup. HWP: half wave plate; QWP, quarter wave
plate; POL: polarizer; SPD, single photon detector.
given by
Tjα =
[
t1 0
t3 + it4 t2
]
.
The values of t1, t2, t3, and t4 are determined numer-
ically by minimizing the following likelihood function:
L(t1, t2, t3, t4) =
∑
ψ=H,V,D,R
[N〈ψ|ρjα(t1, t2, t3, t4)|ψ〉 − n˜ψ]2
2N〈ψ|ρjα(t1, t2, t3, t4)|ψ〉
(40)
where N = n˜H + n˜V .
To estimate the error distributions, we use Monte
Carlo simulations to numerically generate additional
data based on the experimental data and errors in the
setup. As discussed in the Letter, the intensity and in-
put polarization states are relatively stable and no drifts
are observed within the span of the tomography measure-
ment. See Fig. and its caption for details.
We therefore consider two sources of errors: errors in
counting statistics and errors in the angles of waveplates.
To simulate the errors in nψ, we assume the detection
counts follow the Poisson distribution. In the simulation,
a random number nsimψ is generated from the Poisson
distribution with mean given by the experimental value
nψ as an input to the maximum likelihood algorithm.
Errors in setting waveplates’ angles lead to projec-
tion to a state other than the one intended. Our elec-
trical polarization controller has a accuracy of ±0.1◦
(0.00175 rad) in waveplate angle settings. To model er-
rors in waveplate angles θ and φ, random variables θsim
and φsim are generated from the normal distributions
N(θ, 0.001752) and N(φ, 0.001752), respectively, where
θ and φ are the intended angle settings, and N((¯x, σ2)
is the Gaussian distribution with mean x and variance
σ2. The state projected into is given by |ψsim〉 =
U†HWP (θ
sim)U†QWP (φ
sim)|H〉, where |H〉 is the horizon-
tal state given by |H〉 = [1, 0]T .
In each round of simulation, a set of data, including
nsimψ , θ
sim, and φsim , are numerically generated using
the distributions described above, and are used to cal-
culate a density matrix using the maximum likelihood
method. For each state ρjα, a total of 1 × 103 sets of
TABLE II. Angles of waveplates and polarizer angles for
quantum state tomography.
Projective state HWP QWP POL
|H〉 0◦ 0◦ 0◦
|V 〉 45◦ 0◦ 0◦
|D〉 22.5◦ 0◦ 0◦
|R〉 0◦ 45◦ 0◦
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FIG. 8. (Color online). Stability of intensities and input
states during the quantum state tomography. The upper fig-
ure shows the optical power coming out of the encoding sys-
tem (intensity was not attenuated to single photon level in
this measurement). The lower figure shows the stability test
of the input polarization states. Horizontally polarized light
coming out of the encoding system is measured at the H/V
basis by a polarizing beam splitter. The figure shows the ex-
tinction ratio (i.e., the ratio of the power at the H and V
output ports), which is around 35 dB over a period of 1200 s.
The results show that the intensities and polarization states
remain stable within the span of the tomography experiment
(< 5 minutes).
data are simulated to give the error distribution of the
density matrix constructed.
Experimental results
We preformed the loss tolerant MDI-QKD experiment
over 10 km and 40 km of optical fibers. The detailed
experimental data is presented below.
TABLE III. Raw counts in the quantum state tomography
experiment. Counts are accumulated for 10 s.
State
Projected states
|H〉 |V 〉 |D〉 |R〉
ρ0Z 201311 583 112867 114043
ρ1Z 982 203500 122028 110687
ρ0X 114815 117459 35646 38239
10 km loss tolerant MDI-QKD
In this section, we present detailed experimental re-
sults not covered in the main text.
In the 10 km demonstration, we send a total of 6×1011
pulses. The probabilities of sending ρ0Z , ρ1Z , and ρ0X are
P0Z = 0.25, P1Z = 0.25, and P0X = 0.5. The intensities
of the signal state is µ = 0.2 photon per pulse, and the
intensities of the decoy states are ν1 = 0.03 and ν2 = 0
photon per pulse.
Table IV shows QΨ
+,IAIB
jαsβ
, the conditional probability
that Eve gets a successful Bell state measurement with
outcome Ψ+ given that Alice sends out a pulse of inten-
sity IA in the state ρjα and Bob sends out a pulse of
intensity IB in the state ρsβ .
The upper and lower bounds of the yields of single pho-
ton components Y Ψ
+,11
jαsβ
are estimated given the following
constraint [30]:
QΨ
+,IAIB
jαsβ
(1− k√
N IAIBjαsβ Q
Ψ+,IAIB
jαsβ
)
≤
∞∑
m,n=0
e−IA−IB
IA
mIB
n
m!n!
Y Ψ
+,mn
jαsβ
≤
QΨ
+,IAIB ,
jαsβ
(1 +
k√
N IAIBjαsβ Q
Ψ+,IAIB
jαsβ
)
(41)
where Y Ψ
+,mn
jαsβ
is the conditional probability that Eve
gets a BSM outcome Ψ+ given that Alice sends a pulse
of m photons in the state ρjα and Bob sends a pulse of
n photons in the state ρsβ , and N
IAIB
jαsβ
is the number of
pulses where Alice sends the state ρjα with intensity IA
and Bob sends the state ρsβ with intensity IB , and k is
the number of standard deviations, which is chosen to be
k = 3.
An upper bound and a lower bound of Y Ψ
+,11
jαsβ
are es-
timated from the constraint in Eq. (41) using linear pro-
gramming, and the results are presented in Table V.
We can now find an upper bound of the phase error
rate eUX by solving the linear programming problems in
(33) and (34), where the coefficients of the linear system
are given by the Stokes parameters of the actual encoded
states ρE,jα and ρE′,sβ , jα, sβ ∈ {0Z , 1Z , 0X}. We search
in the sets of states generated by Monte-Carlo simulation
and select the one that maximizes eUX = 18.9%, which is
4 standard deviations from the mean.
This high phase error rate is mostly due to the small
key size. As a comparison, we also estimate eUX assuming
we have an infinitely long key. That is, we take N IAIBjαsβ =
∞ when bounding Y Ψ+,11jαsβ , and the results are shown in
Table VI. The tighter bounds of Y Ψ
+,11
jαsβ
lead to an upper
bound eUX = 7.9%.
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40 km loss tolerant MDI-QKD
We perform a demonstration of loss tolerant MDI-
QKD over 40 km of optical fiber. The parameters (in-
tensities and probability distributions of signal and de-
coy states) used are the same as those used in the 10 km
demonstration. Table VII shows the values of the gains
QΨ
+,IAIB
jαsβ
. The upper and lower bounds of the yields
of single photon components Y Ψ
+,11
jαsβ
estimated using the
constraints in (41) are shown in Table VIII. As a proof-
of-principle demonstration, we do not consider finite key
effect when bounding Y Ψ
+,11
jαsβ
. Using the same algorithm,
an upper bound of eX is found to be 12.2%, and the key
rate is R = 1× 10−6 bit per pulse.
MDI-QKD UNDER THE GLLP Analysis
In this section we show how the key rate under the
GLLP analysis is simulated. For simplicity, we assume
that the states prepared by Alice and Bob to be identical
in the GLLP simulation. We use the error preparation
flaw model in [21]. The four BB84 states with prepara-
tion flaws δ are given by
|φ0Z 〉 = |0Z〉
|φ1Z 〉 = −sin
δ
2
|0Z〉+ cosδ
2
|1Z〉
|φ0X 〉 = cos(
pi
4
+
δ
4
)|0Z〉+ sin(pi
4
+
δ
4
)|1Z〉
|φ1X 〉 = cos(−
pi
4
+
δ
4
)|0Z〉+ sin(−pi
4
+
δ
4
)|1Z〉
(42)
where |0Z〉 and |1Z〉 are the perfect horizontal and verti-
cal states (i.e., 〈0Z |1Z〉 = 0).
Under the GLLP analysis, the imbalance of the quan-
tum coin ∆ini is defined as
∆ini =
1
2
[1− F (ρAX , ρAZ)F (ρBX , ρBZ )], (43)
where ρ
A(B)
X and ρ
A(B)
Z are the density matrices of states
in the X and Z bases prepared by Alice (Bob). The
pessimistic assumption of GLLP assumes that Eve can
enhance the imbalance of the quantum coin through the
loss of single-photon components. As a result, the upper
bound of the imbalance ∆ is given by
∆ ≤ ∆ini
Y Ψ+,11
(44)
where Y Ψ
+,11 is the yield of single photons. The phase
error rate e′X is related to ∆ by [21]√
e′X ≤
√
eX + 2
√
∆(
√
(1−∆)(1− eX)−
√
∆eX) (45)
where eX is the bit error rate in the X basis, which can
be measured directly from the sifted key. In the presence
of basis-dependent flaws (∆ini 6= 0), ∆ increases dramat-
ically as the distance increases, leading to a very poor
estimation of the phase error rate e′X .
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TABLE V. Lower bounds (Y Ψ
+,11,L
jαsβ
) and upper bounds (Y Ψ
+,11,U
jαsβ
) of Y Ψ
+,11
jαsβ
in the 10 km experiment. These bounds are
estimated assuming 3 standard deviations of statistical fluctuations for finite key analysis.
jαsβ 0Z0Z 0Z1Z 1Z0Z 1Z1Z 0X0Z 0X1Z 0Z0X 1Z0X 0X0X
Y Ψ
+,11,L
jαsβ
0 2.92× 10−3 2.97× 10−3 0 1.47× 10−3 1.44× 10−3 1.42× 10−3 1.17× 10−3 2.98× 10−3
Y Ψ
+,11,U
jαsβ
5.64× 10−5 3.41× 10−3 3.47× 10−3 6.41× 10−5 1.86× 10−3 1.78× 10−3 1.78× 10−3 1.54× 10−3 3.41× 10−3
TABLE VI. Lower bounds (Y Ψ
+,11,L
jαsβ
) and upper bounds (Y Ψ
+,11,U
jαsβ
) of Y Ψ
+,11
jαsβ
in the 10 km experiment. These bounds are
estimated assuming an infinitely long key.
jαsβ 0Z0Z 0Z1Z 1Z0Z 1Z1Z 0X0Z 0X1Z 0Z0X 1Z0X 0X0X
Y Ψ
+,11,L
jαsβ
4.12× 10−6 3.08× 10−3 3.14× 10−3 2.6× 10−14 1.62× 10−3 1.59× 10−3 1.56× 10−3 1.31× 10−3 3.13× 10−3
Y Ψ
+,11,U
jαsβ
1.77× 10−5 3.31× 10−3 3.35× 10−3 1.18× 10−5 1.76× 10−3 1.69× 10−3 1.69× 10−3 1.45× 10−3 3.31× 10−3
TABLE VII. Experimental values of QIAIBjαsβ (conditional probability that Eve gets a successful Bell state measurement with
outcome Ψ+ given that Alice sends ρjα with intensity IA and Bob sends ρsβ with intensity IB) in the 40 km MDI-QKD
experiment.
State Intensities IAIB
jαsβ ν2ν2 ν2ν1 ν2µ ν1ν2 ν1ν1 ν1µ µν2 µν1 µµ
0Z0Z 0 (5.31± 0.98) (4.90± 0.31) (5.48± 1.03) (1.00± 0.12) (5.97± 0.43) (5.87± 0.48) (6.57± 0.35) (1.28± 0.07)
×10−8 ×10−7 ×10−8 ×10−7 ×10−7 ×10−7 ×10−7 ×10−6
0Z1Z (2.65± 2.65) (3.98± 1.03) (5.60± 0.39) (5.73± 1.15) (1.47± 0.04) (9.55± 0.15) (7.06± 0.43) (8.77± 0.16) (5.63± 0.04)
×10−9 ×10−8 ×10−7 ×10−8 ×10−6 ×10−6 ×10−7 ×10−6 ×10−5
0Z0X (1.51± 1.51) (2.93± 0.16) (1.22± 0.01) (5.59± 0.72) (1.02± 0.03) (1.64± 0.01) (5.32± 0.27) (4.76± 0.07) (4.02± 0.02)
×10−9 ×10−7 ×10−5 ×10−8 ×10−6 ×10−5 ×10−7 ×10−6 ×10−5
1Z0Z (5.11± 3.61) (3.91± 0.95) (5.89± 0.38) (5.72± 1.01) (1.28± 0.05) (8.88± 0.13) (1.20± 0.05) (9.28± 0.14) (5.71± 0.04)
×10−9 ×10−8 ×10−7 ×10−8 ×10−6 ×10−6 ×10−6 ×10−6 ×10−5
1Z1Z 0 (4.13± 1.03) (4.55± 0.37) (8.92± 1.41) (1.42± 0.15) (8.08± 0.51) (1.15± 0.05) (1.39± 0.05) (3.05± 0.09)
×10−8 ×10−7 ×10−8 ×10−7 ×10−7 ×10−6 ×10−6 ×10−6
1Z0X 0 (2.94± 0.17) (1.27± 0.01) (8.32± 0.91) (9.02± 0.28) (1.56± 0.01) (1.29± 0.04) (4.81± 0.07) (3.40± 0.02)
×10−7 ×10−5 ×10−8 ×10−7 ×10−5 ×10−6 ×10−6 ×10−5
0X0Z (4.81± 2.40) (6.07± 0.75) (5.67± 0.26) (4.77± 0.24) (1.19± 0.03) (5.60± 0.08) (1.63± 0.01) (2.06± 0.02) (4.68± 0.03)
×10−9 ×10−8 ×10−7 ×10−7 ×10−6 ×10−6 ×10−5 ×10−5 ×10−5
0X1Z (1.51± 1.51) (5.54± 0.78) (5.30± 0.27) (4.35± 0.21) (1.15± 0.03) (5.05± 0.07) (1.63± 0.02) (1.98± 0.01) (41.3± 0.02)
×10−9 ×10−8 ×10−7 ×10−7 ×10−6 ×10−6 ×10−5 ×10−5 ×10−5
0X0X (2.19± 1.26) (3.12± 0.14) (1.21± 0.01) (4.15± 0.15) (1.99± 0.03) (2.06± 0.01) (1.60± 0.01) (2.45± 0.01) (8.04± 0.02)
×10−9 ×10−7 ×10−5 ×10−7 ×10−6 ×10−5 ×10−5 ×10−5 ×10−5
TABLE VIII. Lower bounds (Y Ψ
+,11,L
jαsβ
) and upper bounds (Y Ψ
+,11,U
jαsβ
) of Y Ψ
+,11
jαsβ
in the 40 km experiment. These bounds are
estimated assuming an infinitely long key.
jαsβ 0Z0Z 0Z1Z 1Z0Z 1Z1Z 0X0Z 0X1Z 0Z0X 1Z0X 0X0X
Y Ψ
+,11,L
jαsβ
0 1.54× 10−3 1.27× 10−3 0 6.92× 10−4 7.47× 10−4 7.46× 10−4 5.86× 10−4 1.39× 10−3
Y Ψ
+,11,U
jαsβ
2.36× 10−6 1.64× 10−3 1.42× 10−3 2.77× 10−5 8.07× 10−4 8.08× 10−4 8.15× 10−4 6.44× 10−4 1.53× 10−3
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